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Perhaps it is  convenient  to  look  back  a  few  ye~rs in our history 
in order  to set up  a  framework  for  our purpose.  On  the  \vhole  since Horld  War  II  .. 
there  seem  to  have been  three periods  in American·-Europe;m  relations:  firstly, 
the  honeymoon;  secondly,  mutuaL reproaches  as  in  a  f am.Lly  qu«rrel;  thirdly, 
a  new  assessment.  The  f:trst  period  runs  from  19lf5  to  1958;  the  second  from 
1958  to  1973;  the  third begins  in 1973,  I  would  like  to  end  with  some  views 
about  the possible future, 
I  - Th.e  Honeymoon  Period 
It starts immediately after  the  end  of  \.Jor]d  Har  II and  culmin:.tes 
in 1949...-.1952  w;tth  the creation of  the  E,C.S.C.  by  the  six countries  in  the  closest 
collaboration with  the United  States, 
First,  the origin of  the  E.C.S.C.  is  to  he  found  in  the  Americ~n 
decision o.f  1949  to  give  up  the occupation  of  Germ;my  Hi th  the  \,T;arning  th2t it 
would  not  allow a  further  occupation of  West  Germany  hy  the  Ettropean  ~llies,  ln 
order  to prevent  the  sort of  politic61.l  antagonism Hhich  followed  Horld  H~r I. 
The  second  origin  :is  to  be  found  ill  t:he  fe:.1r  of  St;tlin;  the  1\erlin airl:ift 
and  all that went  Hith  Jt,  convinced  Em·oJH~;mB  of  tl1e  need  t:o  ignore  the 
technical and  pol:i.tieal  objections  to  wh~t  bec;;~me  tile.~  most  supran~tiot~:o~l j~uropean,.. 
construction ever  achieved,  the  E. C. ~i .c. 2
thB  llni.ted  St;.~t.::1s  and  the 
~  :  - - -~- - ~ 
•  Nom1et  and  Schuman,  Ad(:>n:wr'r  nnd  De  Gasper:i., 
the fath.ers  of  thf~ E.c.s.c.  :J.n  1952  and  tll:is  J.n  turn  }~ave  rise 
The  degree  of  confidence  \:.'St~blishetl  bc~tl·leen  a  man 
and American leaders wag  e:x:t:raordin:a.rily  strong. 
.. 
NilY  I  give  some  illustr;H1ons:  when  the.  Americans  ~1sserted  that 
the  E.C.S.C.  could  become  a  new  version of  the  former  steel cartel het\•Teen 
France,  Germany,  Belgium,  and  Luxembourg,  Nonnet  immediately  asked  George  Ball, 
legal Adviser  to  the American  forces  in Europe,  to clr;tf: t  the  ;;m ti-c..,rtel 
regulations  of  the Treaty  of Paris.  This  text eventually  bec~me Article 56 
of. that Treaty. 
Another  illustration:  the  E.C.S,C.  needed  to  establish its 
international credit,  The  first help  came  from  the  Eximbank  with  a  cheap 
loan for  20  years. 
This  honeymoo~ relationship was  never  to  return  and,  above  all,  not 
at  the  time  of  the  founding  of  the  Common  Market.  The  degree  of:  supr;m;ationality 
and  decision-making  capacity  of  the  E.E.C.  is  ;also  considerably  less  tl1an  was 
evident in  the  Coal  and  Steel Community. 3
,..  ]  -
s tartB  around  19 58  .;rnd  l:asted  until 
I)eriod  parallels  th~t of  gt'mving detente betiVeen  l,J~shington 
The  circumstances  provoked  ·~  we:o1.kening  of the U.s. "'-European reladonship. 
a  tendeney  for both sides  to  give  the  ler~s  t  f;;ivor:o~ble  interpretation 
events  of  interest  to both parties • 
.  lunerica  accused  Europe  of  a  loss  of  s te;;~m  in its drive  toward  H 
United  States  of  Europe,  Europe  reproached  Americi!l  \·7:Lth  its f:.1ilure  to  consult 
its allies in major  decisions -- for  instance,  the  confrontation with Moscow 
"'  over Cuba.  Each side v1•s  justified in its criticism of  the  other.  The  Common 
Market  indeed  looked  likB  a  purely  commercial,  protectionist operation  and 
Europe failed  tci  explain adequately  to  the  United  States  tl1e  very  real difficulties 
of  going  beyond  purely economic  integr01 tion,  and  Americr.<n  anxieties  Here  perfectly 
understandable.  Opposition  to  loss  of  politic.;lJ. sovereignty Has  strongest  in France, 
the oldest of  the six nations -- the  only  one  of  the  six  th.llt  lvriS  older,  and 
much  older,  than  the United  States. 
And  there was  :.tn  ;.(mbiguity  in  the  f;;tct:  tl!;.~t  .!\merle:.~  h.<1d  both  a 
special responsibility  toward  Europe  and  a  glob~l  rc~:P••:1sihUitv 1.:ith  l.arger 
conseqfiences  not  alwRys  understood  hy  Europe. - ~  -- .  -
~epe,d~ll;r European youth,  d6ub Cccl  tla.>  tt9efuJ 1'1ess  of  ,h.l1iet~i.ca' s 
involvement in Vietri«ln1.,  \oJhile  Americ•~ opposed  \vhat  l~<1;shlngton  tHHoJ  {.lS  ... fut::lle · 
\.JIOlr  by  Fl."ance  ag.-:Lnst  the Algerian  nationiitl'i.sts.  TheBe  tt<:o  ':J<tt~>  we:i.glwd  heavily 
bn  th¢ political climate of  th~period, 
Severi.l.l other events contributed  to  the  fmnlly  CJUarrel.  Firstly,·  ..  - - ~ 
American multinational corporations  Here  inde.ed  the  fin;t  to  profit  from  Eurone:iln 
economic  integration.  . Secondly,  the  so-c~lled br«in  dr;;tin  from  Europe  to  America. 
Thirdly,  America's  balance  of  payments  deficits  \\•ere  held  resnonsible  for  inflation 
in Europe.  Fourthly,  inconvertibility of  tbe  cloll.;t.r  in  1971  r.a:i.sed  for  Europeans 
the specter of  1934. 
In America,  there Has  alarm at  France 
1 s  opposition  to  British membt:•r-
ship  in  the  CommonMarket;.  there \o.•as  t:he  b«d  itn«ge  cre;;~.ted  here  by  De  Gaulle's 
imperialistic attitude;  his  scorn  for  the  United  States.  Since  then,  the 
French sociologist Raymond  Aron  h01s  devoted  a  book  to  that  period  in Hhich  he 
cetlls  America  the 
11impe1:i.•l  republic'
1
•  So  the  empire  \·Jas  on  both  sides. 
Fi.nally,  it can  be  admit ted  th:~t  the  astronomic  economic  groVJth  and 
internation:ill suceess  of  Europe  in  t:he  first years  of  the  Common  Narket  went 
to  the heads  of  Europe•ms  :ilnd  led  them  to  believe  that  there Has  no  limit  to 
how  far  Europe's  role  in  the Horld  might  go. 
Jeam-J  <ilcques  Serv~n-Schrc  i.ber 'f'  1CJ(i8  borde  "Tile  1\n:c r i can  Ch;;d lenge'
1 
formulated  the  Europc;;m  01l:titude  to  Amedc;.J  dllong  thcHC'  :lines  very  well,  ~s 
did Dr.  Kissinger
1s  remark  in London  in  1973  tl1at  Europeans  tended  to  measure ~---->~;-__  ~:-.-- -;  - ~-- ._  - .- ---
·tlleir.,J<.le,n~:(ty  by.{t:s  d:i.~~linee ·ft.om  ·the.Ur1ftcd·· 
'<:~_;_::\-_.:~;'-~~~·:·  ~~ - ___ ;,_  ·-- -<:~- _·: - -_  .  -- -
~Utopea  ns• We.re  S l<1W  to  recognize  th:~ t  thc:fr 
million _consunH"!l~s  could tnith.lly be  man;lr;od  bet  t~:'r  by  exner:i.enced 
· Atnerican.muJ.tinati<)nal  f:lrms  t;,~hile  El.n·ope~n  cornor;~Uons had  to  <Adjust  to 
this  ne\v  dimension~ 
Xn  a  1nore  understanding atmosphere,  this '.:ould  hi<ve  been  better 
understood, .~nd  "The  American  Challenge"  might  have  been  seen by  Europe:.1ns 
for what it WflS  .........  a  European  challenge. 
Similarly,  Europe's  tendency  to  measure  its maturity  by  its distance 
from  the United  States rather  than by  distance  from  Eastern  Eurooe  or  China, 
rit  could  have  been  seen  «S  a  compliment  to  America. 
III - A New  Assessn~nt 
(1) Now,  we  turn  to  the  symptoms  of  a  112<·1  Euro-Americ:m  relation. 
When  G;i.scard  d'Est.aing,  Pt:"esident  of  Fr01.nce,  s:<.id  l.ast  month  that  no  country 
could  expect  to  save itself by  the mechamism  of  [-;elf-nrol:Pct:i.on,  it \vr.ls  clear 
that  there was  a  new  political sound  i.n  Paris.  De  C<wllc,  h<rtd  alHavs  insisted 
proudly that France  hotd  existed before  the  Commun:i.ty  dlnd  HOiJld  survive its 
disappearance. \  in tolashington  for  <t  common  energy  s tr:.ltt'gy,  :L t  is  a  far  crv  from  the  t rueulencl' 
of his  g~ullis  t  predecessor,  Jobert  1  narli.er  tldu  yc;,n·.  .J nhert:  \v:w  of  cou rne 
even more  g.;mllis  t  thau  hiF>  President,  Pomp'Ldou. 
Now- Europe  i.s  cotdng  round  to  the  idea  that  G~~rmany  has  dt;;f.:mded · 
for  two  decades - ....  that  the world  economy  C:Jn  only  be  serv1"d  by  ""  cotntnon  front 
of  th.e  'lllaj or industrialized countries,  including,  of  course,  J ;;tp:;m  and  1\rnerJcei, 
Europe is  ~eginning to understand  that  the  pi.n  prickB  ,.,hJch  Eucone  and  Amer.Lca 
gave  each  otheT were  ba.sed  on  false  problems,  ;md  I  think  Amed.c<.t  :Ls  beginning. 
to understand  this also. 
(2)  The  phi.:J.osorhy  seems  to  be  that:  \:!:en  evl>nts  on  a  \·Jorld  level 
turn  to real danger, bot:h  sides  of  the At:Lilntic  co111e  ncrin~r  to  e"ch  other  and 
feel  a  solidG~.rity  that  evapor;;~.tes  in  times  of  euphori~. 
Dis·tances  are relative:  \-Jiten  N;;..~is  and  Soviets  ent:en!d  into  our 
p;i.,ctu:re,  we  felt •n  immense  solidarity \d th  1\Iner:i.c.a  and  noss:Lhly  overestimated it. 
Now  that  the  explosi.v(~ Middle  East  hots  entered  t:l:e  p:i c.t:ure  Rncl  thre01 tens  both 
economic 
European( .balance  .and  pe~ce itself,  He  feel  (T  think  on  both  s:i.cles  of  the  At.L•mcic) 
that we  are joined  together·  for  better or  \vorse. 
,.. - - -
(3)  Th~~Perln~ne_ilt  _Solida~·J:.~ 
(a)  _En~rAY.:  For  years  \-IC'- h'I!Vr\  seen  in  th0  E.c.s.c.  the  d<J.nsu~r 
,--- of  a  growing  dependency  on  oil and  especially  on  Middle-ERst  oll.  Keeping  our 
-marginal  coal mine.s  <~l:l.vc  was  hopelessly  :inadequ.ttte  e<nd  the  atolllic  :~lternat:ive 
develop~d too  slowly,  So  \.Je  became  the  hostages  of  the  Hiddle  East ... 
-90  per cent' of  our oil imports  come  from  thtilt  :<~re;.1. 
To  be  honest:  there \.Jas  room  for  .:~  reevalu<tti.on  of  oil prices  and  of 
the prices ·of  other  raw· 1nliltel:ials,  They  had  suffered  from  inflation on  tndustrial 
goods  which  had  depreciated  the  purchrtsing  po1-1er  of  oil.  Hut  whdl.t  h:-.~s  resulted 
;i.s  a  threat  to  the  Hor1d  economy  and  a  boycott  on  certain countries  like Holland 
for  showing  a  platonic symp.;lthy  for  Isr::~el. 
For  the moment:,  in  the  £b~t-~!~~'  Eu1·opc  h:-.s  no  .rtlt:ernative  source 
of  energy' to  develop.  Our -reaction  Ci.ln  only  be: 
- reduction of  consumption 
~ stabilize coal  production 
~ accelerate prospection  and  production  of  North  Se~ oil 
In  the middle-term:  Europe's  <1ns-v.1er  to  tlte  challenge is  <~n  :lncrease 
in coal production,  not  in  Europ~ but  in  tlte  United  St~tes, permitting  increased 
imports  from  the United  States, 
'·· '  en(}rgy.  The sit;uratlon is sur-11  th.at  the  rn:o:-;pects  of  ;.~n  _1__~-.!_L_~I!.!.~!.L~.:_lJ. 
put on  ftwt  with  Fr_cnch  Jl<H'ticip;ation. 
l  am not  .ollotw  in  <ltt~ching enortnous  .i111portrmce  to  such  ~n.,<lgency; 
\.Jt\ich  cre-.tes  solid«.rity in  times  of  onerg~:!ucy  on  a  b~1s·i ~:  of  ~11  for  one  ~nd 
one  for all.  Each p.ortner wi.ll  thug  h~ve  ""- voice  J.n  Llle  poli.cv  of  t:he  partnership 
:md  the  danger  of  o:U  producers  playing  consumr~r countries  <.1gainst  each  other  is 
diminished,  Simi:l.:u~ly,  the  danger  of m.ajor  'LnmorUIH'.  countries  st:.~.ying silent, 
through  fear,  while  sm;all  nations  heavily  dependent  on  imports  go  to  the  w.all 
;ts  .also  diminish_ed. 
Integra ttng  this  .2gency  :in  the  OECD,  \·lh i ch  1 :i.nks  Europe,  Americ~, 
Canada,  Japan1  and  other cour1tries,  would  make  it nolitic~lly easier for France 
to  join,  especially if .-- as  l~rance :justifiably  dem:.lnds  -- Eurone  spe;aks  with 
a  single voice within  the  agency. 
p01.yments  deficit for  the  \vho:le  of  thP.  OECD  js  est:i111ated  ;J!:  ]()  to_/40 bUlion 
dollars.  For  the  CommunJty,  it is  expect:Pcl  to  be  20  l>i:llLon  dollars.  lt is 
especially heavy for  13rit;;dn,  France,  and  T t:e<ly.  Tn  t:lte  Benelux  countries --
belgium,  llolland '·  •nd  Lu;--:cmbourg  -- ..  r~~vcn··IIll f.!  b;J'l :lll('C'  \v:.ts  l"(;'dllced  to  zero. 
Only  Germany  now  ha:;  a  strong,  posit.ivc  n:wli:l'llb-;  b:;~l;:jllf:e, ·  1'h.~  nort~al  reaction of  the.  insdtutions of  ~t  conmHm  m;.rrket  is 
to keep  th.;~.t  common  tit~rket  open,  arid  t:o  establJsh  cr5n~litions  '-''hr:>reby  the 
member states  c:oin  inf;;tct do  this.  Tldt:  is :lust  v.d1~t  J1.:  hanpen:i.ng,  but  mvi11g 
·to. the weakness  of  the  Corriloun:lty 
1 s  dpc:i.wl.on·-m•lld ng  lllac:lli nr> ry,  n~sul  ts  come 
only slowly.  In  the me.antillW,  ltoaly  has  had  to  introduce  SO!n('  nontari.ff 
barriers in the  Common  Market,  and  Fnmce  lt:~.s  let  ltEl  currency  flo:1t. 
The  common  answer  must  be  ~ Colllmuni ty  lo<m  to  all  the  countries 
in difficulty,  Germany  has  offered  to  f:i nance.  the  b;d  .:.1nc<~  of  payments  clef:Lc.its 
of member  countries,  but  this  is insufficient:.  One  country  should  not:  bear  the 
burden alone,  and  :tt would  be unhealthy  for  the  Community  if one  problem  country 
member  vlets  dependent  on  a  single riclwr  member. 
Oil prices ·must  be  reduced  if we  are  to  prevent  <J  collapse  of  the'. 
wor:Ld  economy,  \vitll  financi:a:~ inst01b.i.lities  ;;mel  m;assive  unemployment  threatening 
th,e  whol,e  of  the industrialized vorld. 
These  tvo  new  events  have  shown  clearly  thr1t  there  is  no  antagonism 
between  the  two  sides  of  the Atlant:Lc  and  that  there  is  no  <~nt2gonism either 
have  to  re•lize.  th'it  America  disposes  of  ;;m  autonon.y  in  its  fl'O">.'•.>ments  th;J.t  the 
EEC  does  not possess.  Europe  is  to  begin  "'il:h  more  dependent  on  exte.nwl energy: 
,....,...  sixty per  cent  of  its  energy  is  i111pnrl:ed,  :..wain~;t:  Lc•11  p~o•r  cent  in 
Ame:ric01,,  J'apan  imports eigh t:y-four  per  cent  -·- Eurone  is  ~ lso  more  vuJnerahle to  the  consequences  of  fln:.~ncia1  inst~hU:Lty  if tntern;ltimHd  'liquidJt:ios  sta~t·t 
to  move,  for  inst:-'nce,  \vhen  petrodoll.;Jrs  sUtrt  shiftJitJl'.  A.cro/3[~  borders  from 
one  member  country'  to  :;wot:her.  \vo  1<rl?  Jr\det~d  ...  Collli110lt  Harket  but  not.  a  ITJonotary 
union. 
The  par<'!doxlc.:oll  situation  'is  tlt:~t:  01  strong  /\meric:.t.n  st~nd  :r~1pd.nst 
abusive oil prices  actue~lly helps  Europe  .;~nd  especla:J Jy  tlJc~  CmunHwity·)  and 
more  th-.n is genenally b(:!lieved.  The  auestion  is  uot  only  :a  financJ~l one;  it 
is also  •  politica1  om~,  Fnmce  hav:Lng  always  had  strong  pro-Arab  sentJrnents  ;;md 
a  pro-Arab· political orientation.  This  French  nol:lcy  is  noH  put  to  a  strong 
challenge,  but it will certainly not  ch;.mge  ;;ts  f~tst  as  Houlcl  be  desir•ble. 
But in  the  end,  the  solid~rity  bet\,'e<~n  the  United  St;~tes  and  Europe 
in this  ca~.se  is evident,  ;;md  together  our  n<rgumcnts  ag:ainst  the  pres,~nt oil 
prices  Oire  very  s t:rong. 
Mr,  Fo1:d  referred  in his  recent  UN  speeclt  to  the  availability  of 
food  as  G~.  weapon  «gai.nst  oil,  He  emph01sized  his  hes~i ta Uon  t:o  intervene  in  the 
conflict \vith  that  \ve.,.pon,  But  as  !  noted  in  ;rt  recent  column  in  ;;~_  Belr,ian  ne\·JS-
paper,  Talleyr•mcl  once  rematrked  the< t  non·-in terven tion is  :.<.  me t;,tplt:vs:i c•ll  concept 
nteaning  essentially  the  same  thing  as  intervention.  l~ord 's  sneech  got  little 
play in Europe,  <itnd  in  OJ.ny  c01se  a  EuropeHn  n~appr;~is;;d  of  its  tr<.<dition;'l.l 
soft attitude in Hediterr.;me;m  a~.ffairs  \·JOu:lcl  indec!d  he  .;;n  ;).gon'tzing  one. the United  Sta1tes  and  Europe.  The  present:  sLtuat:Jou  :-'llmvs  cJe<Jrly  one£~  ag:dn  our 
solid~r:Lty.  Hhy  then  is  Europe  not  lllore  ~~t~_!_S_:.? 
For  the  moment,  uncert<dnt:y  over  BrLt:;J.i_n's  continued  membership 
~ 
weighs  hea1vily  on  t:h.;~  Community's  ori.ent:;:~t:inn,  not  only  in  internation;;~l but 
<l.lso  in internal  Europe;;tn  affairs.  Nobody  knoh'S  if tn  a  fe,,.,  mouths  time  Bt·itain 
will still be  a  mr~111ber  of  the  Europe~n Community  or  n:1t. 
Indeed,  it is very doubtful  th•U:  ;~  !_~J~er~~~lun_J_  i.n  the  United  Kingdom 
on further  adhesion  lvould  get  a  positive  response,  for  experienc(~  h;;w  shown 
how  conservative  our  populations  2re. 
If  a  referendum had  been  org<~.nized  in  1r152  on  the  establishment  of 
the  Coal  and  Steel Communi:ty,  the  answer  of'  tl1c  sjx  (~mJntri.es  \·•ou]d  nrobably  h•we 
been  "no"~  except  perh;.<ps  in Italy.  And  the  same  Hould  very  probably  h;.<ve  been 
true  in  1958,  on  the  cre~tion of  the  European  Econo1nic  CPmmuni ty.  So,  Hi t!J  this 
experience it Has  very  risky  to  let  the  further  adlteston  of  tlie  United  Kingd01n 
depend  on  nt  referendum,  but  this  is  nm.r  :inevit;.<ble. 
If  the  referendum is  to  he  on!anizecl  in  ;;.  yerlr  from  nmv,  the  months 
Oithead  vlill metil.n  in!!._n~~i_!}_J:y_ of  the  Co(lununilv  11ot  onlv  i11  intern:.~U.on;al  hut  .;~J.so 
in Community  ;.<[fCli.rs,  in~ period  oF  h:ist:nrv  full  or  !<·IIf:ipn  ~111d  d<.ll!f:t.!r.  Hut  no 
one  could  possibl)'  fore~;ct~  that  !JrjLisll  :.ldlll'r:inll  Lo  llw  1-:ttropcrnt  C:onHnUllLty  \vollld 
evolve in such  ;,;t  hPsit::.~.nt  VJ~y. The  llr:ltish  hesit<~tion,  hotvever,<:l.s  not  the  sole  ohHL~cJe to 
Community  ~ction.  Th~;1re  are -some  more  JH:'t:m~incnl:  o\Jr;t:H·.les  to  ;,t  more;  pcJFdl:iVl'! 
influence of  the  E.E.C .  .i.n  internation;;d  ~.ffhl:Lrs. 
(1)  Tlw  E.E.C.  is  a  common  market  iilnd  not  ;~n  economic  union  as  lhe 
name  could  suggest:,  .tlncl  still less  PI  monetary  un:ion.  Nmv  ;.l.ll  the  itnp.ort;.mt  · 
decisions  to be  taken in  this period  of  time  ~re on  ;.~_  !Pvel  tl!:ilt  is  not  covered 
by  the existing Treaties  of  Rome  or Paris. 
(2)  In  the  tHenty-five years  that  \ve  have  been  working  at  Europe01.n 
integration  (taking  the  line of  lowest  resistance  by  going  through  economic 
integration first)  \ve  h~ve never  been  able  to  dE!cide  if  Europe  is  to  become  a 
Federation or  a  Confederation.  Especially  in  Fr<.l.nce  ;;~nd  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
the  p01.rtisans  of  a  Confederation  are  in  the  motjority.  Hut  in  d..ll  the  other 
countries,  public opinion is strongly divided.  So  we  need  time  and  probably 
we  \'li;l..l  j..n  practice go  further  along  both  1i.nes  of  Pvolut:lon  for  some  time 
until facts  and  not  doctrine have  the  1.rtst  \•:on!,  that  last Hor.d,  T  hope,  \-Jill 
be  Feder<i't"i6ri.. 
Here  the question could  rise \·.rilat  is  ;;t  prnbah.le  evo1uti.on  in  tlw 
E.E.C.  I  understand  th01.t  some  doubts  could  rise  .::~bout  the  future  of  thL• 
Conununity  we  st01.rted  tlventy  years  ago.  tIt i 11 k  ;.1  r  ~~ i r  " i c tun~  co  u I d  :~It o1·1  :rt 
more  diffcrenciatt'd  ~;it:u<ll:ion  than  ~;i.mp1y  ;.~n  oppo!.;i l:iutt  ht.'LI·Iet'tl  cotnpJl~t:c~  stu!ce~;s 
or  tot01.l  failure. 
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'£hero- is  2  stronghold  o[  Genurwy  :wd  tlw  BenoJux  countr:ies  \vho 
;.trc  keeping th.eir  c.urrenci.cs  in step  and  :Ln  baJ«.ncr~  I·Htlt  the  doll:.~r; 
- Franr:e  shows  good  sign~;  to  iti!:c!)\rMte  thP  !;t:t·ongholcl  sooner  or 
later as  this  country  is  facing  cour~geously a  very  d:l ffj  cui t  ],a lance  of 
payments  situation owing  to  its oiJ  imporl:s.  1n  f;act,  France  has  iniJH)sed  to. 
itself a  ceiling of  its oil paymentB  abrou.td:  10%  .less  th~n  l:.1st  ye<1.r. 
There is  a  serious  threat to  r~aly's political  regime  ~nd  there 
is  a  serious  doubt  about  Britain's  further  p<trt:iclnaUon.  fhtt  even  in case 
Britain leaves,  it is very probOlble  rh<J.t  Ir:el2.ncl  <~ncl  llenmrtrk will  remain  in 
the  Community. 
To  conclude- just three  ideRs. 
The  first is  tliat  for  some  ye~<rs  more,  Europe Hill  be  ;m  economic 
giant  ;;md  a  political midget.  This  is  the  incvit:<O.blc  consequence  of  the  \,';ty 
\ve  have  chosen  to  put  economic  integration  first. 
Secondly,  Europe's  inability  to  make  m.":Jjor  po]itic;;~J  decisions 
internally ;md  int:ern;;~t:ionOllly will  rrob.rth1y  continue  until  the  choices  ~ne 
finally 1nade  by  events  rotther  th;;m  by  doctrine.  So  f.:u,  E•.Jropt:'  has  ad:justed, 
hmvever  slowly,  to  the  course~  of  evt'n ts,  \.Jit;;ll:  :is  <1  F:m:ope;m,  ::t r tt! r  .:.~11?  1\ 
good  definition of  a  European  \-Joulcl  be  ;1  persmi"" \vhr>  knm-:s  h:i s l:orv  n~nd  \vl!o  knowB 
that  he  or  she  knows  il. ·- 'lit  ·-
clouds  \vere  i~~tlwrJng over  the  At:t<~.nt:ic,  both  f>tdu~>  n;nvvd  tm·J;.~nl  solidarity 
Clnd  ~J.ll  governmtm ts  ,.;ere~  able  t:o  m:J.k~~  cl•!ill«nds  on  thc:L r  popu] ati  ons  involvtng 
ne\v  evolutions.  Thenty~five yectrs  ago,  it \vas  NATO,  the  OECD,  Ht~nrlux,  the 
Co.-1·-Steel  Conmnmity,,  the  Europe~n P:i!yments  Union-·  \dtich  h'i.ls  <l.n  ;\n.r~r'tc;.~n 
:Lniti.-tive at  the  end  of  the  M;~rsh.all Aid  era.  This  proves  thr!~  \vlwn  rea·l 
d•mger  looms,  even  Jn  a  too  consc~rvati  ve  Europe,  the  dynami:;m  Js  there.  There 
is  therefore  every  reason  to hope  th.._t  nm.,r  tho:~ t  real  danger  threUl tens  again, 
\ve  \vill adjust.  The  only  question is  \·Jill it 1>(;'  fast  enou~h? 
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